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I. INTRODUCTION
Of William Mitchell’s contributions to the life of the law in 
America, James Bradley Thayer could write in 1900: “On no court 
in the country to-day is there a judge who would not find his peer 
in Judge Mitchell.  That he has been considered in the highest 
circles for the bench of the Supreme Court is, I dare say, as known 
to you as it is to me.”1  Thayer, professor of law at Harvard and one 
of the great legal minds of his time, acknowledged that “I have long 
† Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas Law School (Minnesota).
Dr. Reid holds degrees in American law and canon law from the Catholic
University of America and a Ph.D. from Cornell University.  This article has its 
origin in a talk delivered at William Mitchell College of Law in November 2002.
The author is grateful to his hosts for the warm reception and helpful comments 
he received.  Any mistakes in this Article are, of course, the author’s responsibility.
1. Edwin James Jaggard, William Mitchell 1832-1900, 8 GREAT AMERICAN
LAWYERS 387, 398 (William Draper Lewis ed., Rothman Reprints 1971) (1909) 
(quoting James Bradley Thayer).
1
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recognized Judge Mitchell as one of the best judges in this
country . . . .”2
Mitchell, of Scottish ancestry and Canadian birth, arrived in 
the United States in 1850 to study at Jefferson (now Washington 
and Jefferson) College.3  At college, he received a strongly Calvinist 
education that emphasized logic and moral grounding.4  Although 
his religious convictions would shift and he eventually abandoned 
formal membership in the Presbyterian Church, he remained very 
much what we would call today a “cultural Puritan.”5  Significantly, 
even after dropping formal affiliation with the Church, Mitchell 
“taught Bible class at the First Presbyterian Church of Winona.”6
Mitchell’s presence graced the Minnesota Supreme Court for 
nearly nineteen years, from 1881 to 1900.7  His output was
prodigious.  He produced nearly 1600 judicial opinions.8  It has 
been estimated “that excluding Sundays, and allowing a month in 
each year for vacation, Judge Mitchell wrote one opinion in every 
three days for nineteen years.”9  Indeed, “[i]n point of numbers, his 
opinions exceed those of any other justice of the Supreme Court of 
his state, or the nation.”10  It is one aspect, perhaps the central 
aspect, the unifying theme of this prolific body of work, that is the 
focus of this essay: William Mitchell’s commitment to the basic 
principles and methodology of common-law jurisprudence.
II. WILLIAM MITCHELL: HIS COMMON-LAW
JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTEXT
William Mitchell’s career coincided with the period of the 
greatest flourishing of the common law in American legal history.
In whichever direction one turned, one was likely to encounter a 
great commentator on the common law or a great judge working 
2. Id.
3. Id. at 387.
4. Id. at 388.  “The college facilities were limited.  Its curriculum was narrow; its 
atmosphere surcharged with the Calvinism of the ‘unspeakable Scot’ [John Knox]; 
but the mental drill was exacting and thorough; the moral discipline severe and 
exalting.” Id.
5. See id. at 395-96.  As his biographer put it: “His Scotch loyalty preserved his 
association with the Presbyterians . . . .” Id.
6. Justice William Mitchell: A Centennial Tribute, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5, 10 
(1981).
7. Id. at 11-13.
8. See Jaggard, supra note 1, at 426.
9. Id. at 425.
10. Id. at 427.
2
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within that tradition.  There was Joel Prentiss Bishop, author of 
multiple treatises on various aspects of the common law, who was 
perhaps the greatest of the nineteenth-century treatise writers.11  In 
his own day, Bishop was probably at least as influential, where the 
broad mass of practitioners was concerned, as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.12  There was James Coolidge Carter, who “was perhaps the 
most respected appellate advocate in the nation.”13  “As a
jurisprudential writer, Carter was the preeminent American
champion of historical jurisprudence . . . ,”14 upon which he drew 
to advocate on behalf of the singular importance of an unwritten, 
evolving common law to the development of the American legal 
order.15
There was also Thomas Cooley, another of the great treatise 
writers of the day and a leading judge.  His treatise on
constitutional limitations, G. Edward White has observed, provided 
an important intellectual support for the growth of theories of 
substantive due process, though Cooley shied away from such 
general terminology.16  There was Charles Schuster Zane, the Chief 
Justice of the Utah Territorial Supreme Court, who is considered 
even today to be the founder of Utah law.17  There was also Charles 
Zane’s son, John Maxcy Zane, another notable treatise-writer and 
commentator on the law, as well as prominent Utah and Chicago 
lawyer.18
This whole way of thinking about the law was still in full vigor 
in the early years of the twentieth century.  Benjamin Cardozo, in 
many respects, represents its final flowering.  An opinion like 
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. is an outstanding example of his deft 
11. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 215 
(1995).
12. See id. at 217. Siegel has written: “Bishop may be more representative of the 
mass of nineteenth-century middle-class lawyers than the [elites of the Harvard Law 
School faculty].” Id.
13. Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW
& HIST. REV. 577, 578 (2002).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 579.
16. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 118-19 (New York: Oxford University Press 1976) (referring to T.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 355 (1868)).
17. See Thomas G. Alexander, Charles S. Zane: Apostle of the New Era, 34 UTAH
HIST. Q. 290 (1966); John Maxcy Zane, A Rare Judicial Service: Charles S. Zane, 19 J. ILL.
STATE HIST. SOC’Y. 31 (1926).
18. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Foreword to JOHN MAXCY ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW, ix, 
ix-xxii (2d ed. 1998).
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use of precedent within the common-law framework.19  Cardozo’s
view of the role of the common-law judge as artist is a view that 
would have resonated with nineteenth-century judges like William
Mitchell.
Now, what were the main premises of this common-law
tradition?  Its jurisprudence, as already intimated, can best be 
described by the term “historical jurisprudence.”  The term
“historical jurisprudence” itself is no longer much in use, although
we still employ the fruits of this method of reasoning when we have 
recourse to the doctrine of precedent, or employ such metaphors 
as the evolution, or growth, or development of legal doctrines from 
certain principles.  It does well to bear in mind that not every legal 
order perceives law as an evolutionary enterprise.  That we tend to 
use such terms unreflectively, almost as second nature, is testimony 
to the hold that historical jurisprudence has over us still.
In its origins, this way of viewing the law can be traced to 
seventeenth-century England and the thought-world of the great 
English common lawyers, Sir Edward Coke, Sir John Selden, and 
Sir Matthew Hale.20
These English lawyers were believers in a natural law—a
transcendent law ultimately of divine origin which established 
norms of right and wrong and governed the affairs of nations.
Matthew Hale thus saw the hand of providence in human affairs, 
“to the point where a falling stone or a parish boundary were seen 
to manifest the will of God.”21  They also believed in a positive law, 
the statute-law of the temporal realm, valid by reason of enactment 
by king and parliament.22  Thus Matthew Hale included among the 
sources of law “[t]he authority of Parliament to make law,” and 
“[t]he judicial decisions of courts of justice.”23
But these English lawyers also believed, in a way that their 
predecessors had not, in a way, I fear, that we sometimes do not, in 
19. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).  Justice Cardozo used precedent to determine 
that an automobile company had a strict duty with respect to faulty wheels purchased 
from a third party company due to the nature of the business. Id.
20. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,
103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1993).
21. ALAN CROMARTIE, SIR MATTHEW HALE, 1609-1676: LAW, RELIGION, AND
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 235 (1995). For examples of how this view of providence 
affected his judging, see generally Maija Jannson, Matthew Hale on Judges and Judging, 9 J. 
LEGAL HIST. 201 (1988) (reprinting portions of Matthew Hale’s diary).
22. See Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1720-21.
23. JOHN HOSTETTLER, THE RED GOWN: THE LIFE AND WORKS OF SIR MATTHEW
HALE 190 (2002).
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the normative significance of the past.24  Historical jurisprudence, 
on this account, is the recognition that law is the product, at least 
in part, of the distinct historical experiences of the political
community.  The distinctive history of nations and peoples
conditioned the sorts of law each nation would have.  Society, as 
Edmund Burke observed, was a covenant among the generations—
the past, the present, and those generations yet unborn.25  Law, 
continuous over time, faithful to first principles, reflective of the 
received wisdom of the ages, was the bond that held the
generations together.26
The English common law, on this analysis, was the product of 
the distinct historical experiences of the English people.27  Its 
existence, at least to the common lawyers who gave it shape and 
substance, was seen as a gradual, almost providential, unfolding of 
history.  England, seen as a kind of chosen people, was thus 
understood by English jurisprudes as blessed with a legal order that 
fitted its needs as a free and commercial people.28
The three greatest historical jurisprudes of the seventeenth 
century, the three lawyers responsible for the development of this 
conceptual apparatus—Coke, Selden, and Hale—understood the 
legal reasoning that accompanied this legal order as a type of 
“artificial reason,” by which they meant not that it was in some way 
false or merely pretence, but rather that it was the product of art—
the result of human handiwork.29  And this handiwork was
necessarily historical.  As Sir Edward Coke wrote:
[R]eason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself 
is nothing else but reason; which is to be understood of an 
artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study,
observation and experience, and not of every man’s
natural reason; for Nemo nascitur artifex.  This legal reason 
est summa ratio.  And therefore if all the reason that is 
dispersed into so many several heads were united into 
24. See Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1655.
25. See Bruce P. Frohnen, Multicultural Rights?  Natural Law and the Reconciliation 
of Universal Norms With Particular Cultures, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 39, 59-60 (2002) (citing 
EDMUND BURKE, Essay Towards a History of the Laws of England, in 6 THE WORKS OF THE 
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 413, 416 (Bohn ed. 1854)).
26. Id. at 60.
27. See Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1733.
28. Id. at 1722.
29. Id. at 1689. Cf. Charles Gray, Reason, Authority, and Imagination: The 
Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke, in CULTURE AND POLITICS FROM PURITANISM TO THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT 25, 30-31 (Perez Zagorin ed. 1980).
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one, yet could he not make such a law as the law of 
England is; because by many succession of ages it hath 
been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave 
and learned men, and by long experience grown to such a 
perfection for the government of this realm, as the old 
rule may be justly verified of it, Neminem oportet esse
sapientiorem legibus: No man out of his own private reason 
ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of 
reason.30
The best of the English lawyers appreciated that the common 
law was not unchanging.  But, they argued, it evolved in a way that 
was faithful to its first premises.31  Thus, for instance, Sir Matthew 
Hale could write:
[T]hough those particular variations and accessions have 
happened in the laws, yet they being only partial and 
successive, we may with just reason say, they are the same 
English laws now, that they were 600 Years since in the 
general . . . [just] as Titius is the same man he was 40 years 
since, though physicians tell us, that in a tract of seven 
years, the body has scarce any of the same material
substance it had before. 32
The method the English common lawyers employed to analyze 
the law—it seems almost uniquely adapted to a historical view of 
legal development—was the doctrine of precedent.  We who work 
within the common-law tradition take the doctrine of precedent for 
granted.  It would come as a surprise, I think, to most American 
legal scholars to realize that most European systems have
traditionally lacked a strong notion of precedent.  To be sure, the 
French rely upon jurisprudence—the “teaching” of the courts,33 while 
the courts of canon law in Rome look to stylus or praxis—the settled 
practice of the courts.34  But reliance on teaching and customary 
practice does not constitute reasoning by precedent in the fashion 
30. Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority, and Will”: Sir Edmund Coke and the 
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 44 (1997) (quoting SIREDWARD
COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 97b (Charles A. Butler ed., Legal Classics Library 
1985) (1628)).
31. Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1713.
32. Id.  (quoting MATHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMMON LAW OF 
ENGLAND 40 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (3d ed. 1739) (spelling modernized)).
33. See André Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459, 
462-68 (1976).
34. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND MARRIAGES IN THE 
COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA 27 (1972).
6
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that is practiced within the Anglo-American tradition.
In fact, by the seventeenth century, the English lawyers had 
come to make use of a theory of precedent that historians now call 
“traditionary.”35  In operation, this doctrine of precedent bore 
greater resemblance to its Continental counterparts than to the 
strict doctrine of precedent that rose to prominence in the
nineteenth century and in modified form remains with us today.36
“[P]erhaps the first recorded use of the term ‘precedent’” 
occurred in 1557, in a case where “it was said that judgment was 
given ‘notwithstanding two presidents.’”37  In 1673, a little more 
than one hundred years later, one sees Chief Justice John Vaughan 
of the Court of Common Pleas distinguish between the court’s 
holding and sayings of the Court that were extraneous, which 
Vaughan labeled “gratis dictum.”38  It is the holding that we should 
be concerned with identifying, Vaughan admonished his readers, 
and dicta which we are free to ignore.39
Until about the year 1800, however, it was not, as Lord
Mansfield put it in 1762, “the letter of particular precedents” that 
made law, but “[t]he reason and spirit of cases.”40  The judge, on 
this analysis, remained responsible for discerning whether prior 
case law was sound, reasonable, and congruent with the first
principles of the legal order.41
Gradually, however, with the dissemination and triumph of 
theories of legal positivism, made popular in the first third of the 
nineteenth century by scholars like John Austin and Jeremy
Bentham, a strict doctrine of precedent became an intellectually 
coherent possibility.42  The strict doctrine, as any first-year law 
student knows, looks to whether a particular precedent is “on all 
fours” with the present case.43  Where such a match could be 
identified, the court is bound by the principle of stare decisis and is 
35. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal 
Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 449 (1996); H. Jefferson Powell, 
The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 969 (1993).
36. See Berman & Reid, supra note 35, at 449; Powell, supra note 35, at 969-71.
37. See Berman & Reid, supra note 35, at 446 (quoting CARLETON KEMP ALLEN,
LAW IN THE MAKING 204 (7th ed. 1964)).
38. Id. at 447 (quoting Bole v. Horton, 124 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1124 (K.B. 1673)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 449 (quoting Fisher v. Prince, 97 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (K.B. 1762)).
41. See Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of the Notion of Our Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN 
LAW 9, 16-17 (Laurence Goldstein ed. 1987).
42. See Berman & Reid, supra note 35, at 449, 514-15.
43. Id. at 514.
7
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not free to vary from the prior holding.44
The common-law system of reasoning, with its reliance on 
historical tradition and on precedent—in both its traditionary and 
more modern epiphanies—was intended to promote adaptive 
change within the boundaries of established prior opinions.  James 
Coolidge Carter, for instance, argued on behalf of the creative role 
of precedent by pointing to the “condition of constant change” that 
characterizes the “complicated societies” of his day.45  It is better, 
Carter argued, that courts, not legislatures, take the lead in the 
reform of the law, since courts have the tradition of the common 
law upon which to draw, and can thus render decisions in accord 
with the traditions of the country and narrowly tailored to meet 
social needs.46
It thus belonged to the common-law judge, Carter asserted, 
taking account of precedent, looking to “the ordinary ways in 
which the business, the intercourse, and the conduct of life are 
conducted,” “to find the best rule by which the case may be
determined.”47  Carter’s emphasis of the words “find” and “best” 
indicated the creative role he expected the judge to play.  Like Sir 
Edward Coke, like Sir Matthew Hale, Carter expected his judge to 
have long experience in the law and to be able to employ its 
principles creatively, adaptively, and faithfully, when confronted 
with novel questions and circumstances.48  This was the thought-
world in which William Mitchell moved and the vision of the 
common law that we can safely say he endorsed.
III. JUSTICE WILLIAM MITCHELL: THE CREATIVE
USE OF COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES
With this as background, we can now consider the tradition 
and the thought-world within which Justice Mitchell operated, and 
the ways in which that thought-world influenced his own work as a 
judge.  His position as a prolific justice on the Supreme Court of a 
state only recently admitted to the Union at the time of his
elevation to the bench conferred on him exceptional latitude in 
looking to the whole of the common-law tradition for guidance.
44. Id.






William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/13
REID_AUG.10_READYFORFINALPROOF.DOC 9/15/2003 5:37 PM
2003] JURISPRUDENCE OF WILLIAM MITCHELL 221
But his work, it seems clear, remained entirely within that tradition.
While he utilized the tradition creatively in fashioning solutions for 
pressing legal problems, he did not feel himself free to break its 
bonds.
A. The Historical Grounding of Justice Mitchell’s Common Law 
Jurisprudence
Like the best writers in the tradition of the common law and 
historical jurisprudence, Justice Mitchell recognized both the
necessity that common-law reasoning be historically grounded and 
the possibility that common-law principles were capable of
expansion, modification, and growth.  Writing in dissent in Cigar
Makers Protective Union v. Conhaim, Mitchell declared: “[I]t is one of 
the chief excellencies of the common law that its principles are 
capable of application to new conditions as they arise . . . .”49  And 
in National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co., Mitchell asserted that 
the common-law teaching on contracts in restraint of trade had to 
be understood historically:
Formerly in England the courts frowned with great
severity upon every contract [in restraint of trade].  The 
reasons for this partly grew out of the English law of 
apprenticeship, by which, in its original severity, no
person could exercise any regular trade or handicraft 
except after having served a long apprenticeship . . . .
Hence, if a person was prevented from pursuing his
particular trade, he was practically deprived of all means 
of earning a livelihood, and the state was deprived of his 
services.  No such reason now obtains in this country, 
where every citizen is at liberty to change his occupation 
at will.  Moreover, as cheaper and more rapid facilities for 
travel and transportation gradually changed the manner 
of doing business, so as to enable parties to conduct it 
over a vastly greater territory than formerly, the courts 
were necessarily compelled to readjust the test or standard 
of the reasonableness of restrictions as to place.  And 
again, modern investigations have much modified the 
views of courts as well as political economists as to the 
effect of contracts tending to reduce the number of 
competitors in any particular line of business.  Excessive 
competition is not now . . . necessarily conducive to the 
49. 40 Minn. 243, 248, 41 N.W. 943, 946 (1889) (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
9
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public good.  The fact is that the early common-law
doctrine in regard to contracts in restraint of trade largely 
grew out of a state of society and of business which has 
ceased to exist, and hence the doctrine has been much 
modified, as will be seen by comparison of the early 
English cases with modern decisions,—both English and 
American.  A contract may be illegal on grounds of public 
policy because in restraint of trade, but it is of paramount 
public policy not lightly to interfere with freedom of
contract.50
Justice Mitchell’s stance on the need to move beyond the 
classic formulations of the English common law on restraint of 
trade was a controversial position to take in late nineteenth-century
America as many lawyers and policy-makers came to view
monopolistic practices as harmful to the economic interests of 
substantial portions of the American public.51  But Justice Mitchell’s 
reasoning on behalf of taking a fresh look at the law of contracts in 
restraint of trade, given changes in economic circumstance, is of a 
piece with the historically grounded reasoning advocated by men 
like Carter, or even, classically, Sir Matthew Hale.  Fidelity to the 
past was important because it served as a starting point for analysis; 
but one was not necessarily tied to the decision-making of the past, 
where the court felt needs of the time demanded something else.52
Like other great common-law judges and writers, such as 
50. 45 Minn. 272, 275-76, 47 N.W. 806, 807 (1891).
51. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1219-21, 1224-30 (1988).  Mitchell’s argument, in fact, anticipates the United 
States Supreme Court’s own narrowing of the antitrust statutes through the Rule of 
Reason Doctrine. Id. at 1220-21 (explaining the Rule of Reason).
52. At times, however, despite his own misgivings, Justice Mitchell felt
constrained by the common-law rule.  Kremer v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway 
Co. involved an action to recover possession of a strip of land over which the 
defendant Railway apparently laid its track.  54 Minn. at 157, 55 N.W. at 928 (1893).
Plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded damages to compensate for the taking that 
had occurred. Id.  The railway then moved for a second trial. Id.  Mitchell held in 
favor of the motion despite serious reservations:
The right to a second trial in actions for the recovery of real 
property is a relic of the fictions of the old common-law action of 
ejectment, which had their foundation, in part, at least, in the old 
feudal idea that the title to real property is too sacred to be 
concluded by the result of one trial, or even one action, which, in 
my judgment, has no justification for its continued existence . . . .
But we see no way of preventing this under the statute as it now 
exists.
Id. at 161, 55 N.W. at 929.
10
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Cooley, Carter, and Cardozo, Mitchell understood that the
common law was not a static and unchanging body of rules.
We recognize the fact that the common law is not a code 
of cast-iron rules, but a system of principles capable of 
being applied to new conditions as they arise; and when a 
case arises which falls within a recognized legal principle 
the fact that it is new in instance will not and ought not to 
stand in the way of the courts applying the principle.53
But this case also illustrates the limits which Justice Mitchell 
was willing to place upon common-law creativity.  A husband had 
separated from his wife, but subsequently wrote to her seeking a 
reconciliation.54  Western Union failed to convey the wife’s
affirmative reply in a timely fashion and the man sued for the 
mental distress this delay caused him.55
Mitchell conceded that telegraphs presented a novel form of 
communication and that Western Union did, indeed, cause the 
plaintiff to suffer acute distress.56  But the allowance of a cause of 
action for mental distress seemed too large a departure from the 
common-law tradition to countenance.57  Courts were not really 
free to violate common-law principles:
Courts have no more right thus to abrogate the common 
law than they have to repeal the statutory law.  The
principles of the common law were founded upon
practical reasons, and not upon a theoretical logical
system; and usually, when these principles have been
departed from, the evil consequences of the departure
have developed what these reasons were. The truth is,
once depart from the old rule, and we are all at sea,
without either rudder or compass.58
Mitchell had no desire to create a rule “allowing damages for 
mental suffering resulting from the nondelivery of a telegraph 
message.”59  Texas had established such a rule and the Texas 
decision opened a “vast field of speculative litigation.”60  Mitchell’s
fear of judicial mischief was too strong to permit him to subject the 
53. Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 265, 59 N.W. 1078, 1081 (1894).





59. Id.  at 262, 59 N.W. at 1080 (citation omitted).
60. Id.  at 263, 59 N.W. at 1080 (citing So Relle v. Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881)).
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Minnesota courts to the same kind of speculative traffic.
Reading these cases together, Justice Mitchell can be seen to 
favor development of law faithful to the first principles of the 
common law; but too great a departure from principles amounted 
to a radical break and could not be allowed.  Where to draw the 
line was, for Mitchell, as it would have been for his seventeenth-
century predecessors, a matter of art, and long exposure to the 
“artificial reason” of the law.
B. Common-Law Reasoning and Fundamental Rights
In a day before the emergence of modern constitutional law 
and the application by means of the incorporation doctrine of the 
Bill of Rights to the states, a judge like Mitchell tended to look to 
the common law as a source of rights of the citizen against the 
state.
Bardwell v. Anderson involved a challenge to a Minnesota statute
permitting service by publication in lieu of personal service in cases 
involving the foreclosure of real estate mortgages and the
enforcement of mechanics’ liens.61  In considering the validity of 
the challenge, Mitchell began with the common law:
Suffice it to say that, from the earliest days of the territory 
down at least to 1866, such substituted service [service by 
publication] in actions strictly judicial in their nature, and 
proceeding according to the course of the common law, 
was only allowed where the defendant could not be found 
within the state; personal service being, in accordance 
with the uniform rule and practice from time
immemorial, required in all cases where the defendant 
could be found, and service made upon him, within the 
jurisdiction of the court.62
Mitchell focused in particular on the question of “whether it is 
competent for the legislature to authorize such service in such 
actions upon residents of the state personally present, and capable 
of being found, and personally served, within its jurisdiction.”63  He 
responded by looking in particular to the definitions of the term 
and concept “due process of law,” as developed by the common law 
tradition.64
61. 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315 (1890).
62. Id. at 98, 46 N.W. at 316.
63. Id. at 101, 46 N.W. at 317.
64. Id. at 101-04, 46 N.W. at 317-18.
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Mitchell looked to the argument of Daniel Webster in the 
Dartmouth College case for his definition of due process: “The
general law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon 
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.”65  With this
declaration as his guiding principle, Mitchell considered the types 
of action where personal notice was and was not required.66
Personal service was not required in actions in rem, such as suits in
admiralty.67  In such cases, “the process of the court goes against 
the thing which is in the custody of the court, and technically the 
defendant.”68  There was also a second class of cases, such as 
probate, or “the exercise of the right of eminent domain, [or] the 
exercise of the power of taxation,”69 where “personal notice to 
persons interested in the subject or object of the proceedings has 
never been deemed necessary.”70
But actions in personam, which included actions to foreclose on 
mortgages, historically received different treatment by the common 
law.71  In these cases, Mitchell asserted:
[F]rom the earliest period of English jurisprudence down 
to the present, as well as in the jurisprudence of the 
United States derived from that of England, it has always
been considered a cardinal and fundamental principle 
that in actions in personam proceeding according to the 
course of the common law, personal service (or its
equivalent, as by leaving a copy at his usual place of
abode) of the writ, process or summons must be made on 
all defendants resident and to be found within the
jurisdiction of the court.72
This did not mean that various forms of constructive service 
were never possible, but “that the right to resort to such
constructive or substituted service in personal actions proceeding 
according to the course of the common law rests upon the
necessities of the case, and has always been limited and restricted to 
cases where personal service could not be made.”73
65. Id. at 101-02, 46 N.W. at 317 (quoting Daniel Webster, argument of counsel, 
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 581 (1819)).
66. Id. at 102, 46 N.W. at 317.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 103, 46 N.W. at 318.
72. Id. at 103, 46 N.W. at 317.
73. Id. at 103, 46 N.W. at 318.
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In this way, Mitchell used the ancient rights conferred by the 
common law as a means of restricting the power of the legislature.
“Although the legislature may at its pleasure provide new remedies 
or change old ones, the power is nevertheless subject to the
condition that it cannot remove certain ancient landmarks, or take 
away certain fundamental rights which have been always recognized 
and observed in judicial procedures.”74  The common law itself thus 
became, at the hands of an expert practitioner like Mitchell, the 
source of rights that the positive legislative acts of a legislature 
could not contravene.
C. Trial By Jury and Judicial Restraint
Mitchell not only used the categories of the common law as a 
means of restraining legislative power, he used it as a means of 
restraining the power of the courts as well.  Lommen v. Minneapolis 
Gaslight Co. involved a challenge to a statute establishing the
ground rules by which a “struck” or special jury might be
constituted.75  The adoption of the struck jury in a large number of 
states in nineteenth-century America was in emulation of English 
reforms of the eighteenth century.76  English statutes of the early 
eighteenth century treated the terms “special jury” and “struck 
jury” as synonymous.77
The term “struck jury” came into use in England because of 
the method employed in assembling the jury: “[T]he formation 
procedure, allowing each party to strike twelve prospective jurors 
from a panel of forty-eight names, was the consistent distinctive 
characteristic.”78  The purpose behind the adoption of the struck 
jury system in the nineteenth-century United States was to give “the 
parties some degree of control over jury composition that they 
otherwise would not have had.”79  The system was typically
employed in order to facilitate informed decision-making,80
74. Id. at 102, 46 N.W. at 317.
75. 65 Minn. 196, 68 N.W. 53 (1896).
76. The history of the struck or special jury is traced by James Oldham. See
James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (1983); James 
C. Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and Its Relation to 
Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Challenges, 6 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (1998).
77. Oldham, Origins, supra note 76, at 176.
78. Id.
79. Oldham, History, supra note 76, at 652.
80. See id. at 671.
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although it has come under fire today because it can frustrate the 
goal of assembling a jury that reflects a cross-section of the
community, thereby enhancing the possibility that racial animus 
might play a role in jury composition.81
The Minnesota statute at issue reflected English practice and 
was typical of many of the statutes of its day.  Parties to litigation 
were empowered to make a demand for a special jury with the clerk 
of courts,82 the sheriff was then required to assemble forty persons 
judged by the sheriff to be the “most indifferent between the 
parties, and the best qualified to try such issue,”83 the parties 
themselves were then allowed to strike twelve names each,84 and the 
jury would consist of the first twelve of the sixteen remaining 
persons to appear at the courthouse.85  The statute was challenged 
as being in violation of the state constitution, as impermissible 
“class legislation . . . unequal in its operation,” and as “contrary to 
the American system of jury trial . . . .”86
Mitchell commenced his analysis of the statute by articulating 
a powerful defense of judicial restraint:
Inasmuch as the legislature is a co-ordinate branch of the 
government, the courts do not sit to review or revise their 
legislative action; and hence, if they hold an act invalid, it 
must be because the legislature has failed to keep within 
its constitutional limits.  A court has no right to declare an 
act invalid solely on the ground of unjust or oppressive 
provisions, or because it is supposed to violate the natural, 
social, or political rights of the citizen, unless it can be 
shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights 
guarantied or protected by the constitution.87
But even though Mitchell decided the case on constitutional 
grounds, he nevertheless looked to the common law in order to
give content to the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.  “What 
is ‘trial by jury’ to which the constitution refers?” Mitchell asked.88
“The expression ‘trial by jury,’” Mitchell continued, “is as old as 
Magna Charta, and has obtained a definite historical meaning, 
81. Id. at 671-75.




85. Id. at 207, 68 N.W. at 53.
86. Id. at 207, 68 N.W. at 54.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 209, 68 N.W. at 55.
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which is well understood by all English-speaking peoples; and, for 
that reason, no American constitution has ever assumed to define 
it.  We are therefore relegated to the history of the common law.”89
Reviewing the history of the jury, Mitchell found three
elements to be absolute: “The essential and substantive attributes 
or elements of jury trial are and always have been number,
impartiality, and unanimity.  The jury must consist of 12; they must 
be impartial and indifferent between the parties; and their verdict 
must be unanimous.”90  These characteristics were themselves fixed 
by the common law.
The statute in question cannot be said, Mitchell observed, to 
violate either the requirement of number or unanimity.91  If the 
struck jury violated any of these elements, it must be impartiality.92
Impartiality, Mitchell noted, might be implicated by two aspects of 
the statute: the possibility that the sheriff may wish to “pack” the 
jury;93 and the absence of a procedure for lodging peremptory 
challenges, aside from the procedure for striking jurors.94
Mitchell answered these concerns through an appeal to the 
history of the common law.  In fact, Mitchell noted, struck juries 
have their origin not in a desire to pack jury panels but to ensure 
impartiality: “The main object of special juries was protection 
against packed or incompetent common juries.”95  England,
furthermore, even at the time Mitchell wrote, did not recognize 
peremptory challenges.96  Neither element, therefore, seemed 
essential to ensure impartiality.
Furthermore, Mitchell observed, many of the states of the 
Union have employed special juries.  “[T]he Middle and Southern 
states seem generally to have recognized special juries as an
existing common-law institution, and to have commenced to
regulate it by statute at an early day.”97  New York thus adopted the 
special jury in 1801 and Georgia in 1799.98  Mitchell asserted:




92. Id. at 210, 68 N.W. at 55.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 211, 68 N.W. at 55.
95. Id. at 212, 68 N.W. at 55.
96. Id. at 211, 68 N.W. at 55.
97. Id. at 212, 68 N.W. at 56.
98. Id. at 212-13, 68 N.W. at 56.
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jury was, in all essential particulars, the same as under our 
statute, and as at common law in England.  Most, if not all, 
of these statutes, were enacted in the several states after 
the adoption of their constitutions, containing the same 
or similar provisions as to the right of the trial by jury 
which are contained in the constitution of Minnesota; and 
yet, until the present case, the constitutionality of these 
statutes has never, so far as we can discover, been even 
questioned, except once . . . .  Struck or special juries, and 
the present mode of selecting them, had been known to 
and recognized by the law, as being in accordance with 
the common-law right of trial by jury, for ages before the 
adoption of the constitution of this state.  It is rather late 
in the day to discover the unconstitutionality of such acts; 
and it would certainly require great temerity for courts 
now to assume to have discovered some new ground on 
which to hold them invalid.99
Mitchell concluded by agreeing with counsel that the struck 
jury presented the occasion for abuse, but responded by returning
to the theme of judicial restraint:
Counsel has much to say about abuses that have grown up 
by reason of collusion between dishonest litigants and 
friendly or corrupt sheriffs; but, if such abuses have grown 
up, this is an argument to address to the legislature,
rather than to the courts.  All laws are subject to be 
abused by corrupt and dishonest men.100
Mitchell thus concluded where he had commenced: the
proper spheres of competence of legislature and judiciary.  In 
between, he sketched out in magnificent detail the common-law
foundations of the right to trial by jury, identifying in the process 
the three inalienable elements: number, impartiality, unanimity.
Provided these elements were preserved, he was willing to allow the 
legislature to regulate the details.  So much had been allowed in 
England, and so much would be permitted in Minnesota.
D. Sunday Closing Laws
Sunday closing laws were a feature of American law almost 
from the beginning of English colonial efforts in the New World.
Seventeenth-century English sabbatarian legislation generally
99. Id. at 214, 68 N.W. at 56-57.
100. Id. at 215, 68 N.W. at 57.
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applied to the colonies as well as to the mother country.101  The 
newly independent states generally reiterated variations of these 
legislative schemes and enacted new ones.
From an early date in American legal history, challenges were 
raised to such legislation as representing infringements on
religious freedom.102  In upholding the legislation, judges tended to 
rely upon overt appeals to Christianity. Commonwealth v. Wolf thus 
involved the prosecution of a Jew who observed a Saturday sabbath 
and who contended that the Decalogue’s injunction that “six days 
shalt thou labor and do all that thou has to do” required him to 
labor on Sunday.103  Purporting to interpret both Christian
commandment and Jewish Talmud, the Court declared that “[i]t is 
of the utmost moment . . . that [the people] should be reminded of 
their religious duties at stated periods.”104  The freedom of
conscience guaranteed by the commonwealth’s constitution “was 
never intended to shelter those persons, who, out of mere caprice, 
would directly oppose those laws for the pleasure of showing their 
contempt and abhorrence of the religious opinions of the great 
mass of the citizens.”105
This reasoning was part and parcel of a belief that the
Christian religion itself constituted part of the common law.106  “In 
his inaugural address as Dane Professor of Law at Harvard
University, [Joseph] Story elaborated on this claim: ‘One of the 
beautiful boasts of our municipal jurisprudence is, that Christianity 
is a part of the common law, from which it seeks the sanctions of its 
101. See Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L. REV. 675, 
682-83 (2000). See also WINTON U. SOLBERG, REDEEM THE TIME: THE PURITAN SABBATH
IN EARLY AMERICA (1977).
The new doctrine of the Sabbath which emerged in England at 
the turn of the seventeenth century was influential throughout 
various strata of society at the time the colonization of America 
began.  Englishmen carried the theory to all the original American 
settlements, and the growth of Sabbatarianism in many different 
geographical areas and social structures demonstrated the
powerful force of Puritan ideology in molding early American 
culture.
Id. at 85.
102. King, supra note 101, at 688-97.
103. 3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 50 (Pa. 1817).
104. Id. at 51.
105. Id.
106. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Religious Conscience and the State in U.S.
Constitutional Law, 1789-2001, in RELIGION RETURNS TO THE PUBLIC SQUARE: FAITH AND 
POLICY IN AMERICA 63, 68-69 (Hugh Heclo & Wilfred M. McClay eds., 2003).
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rights, and by which it endeavors to regulate its doctrines.’”107
Nineteenth-century claims that Christianity constituted a part 
of the common law were advanced for a variety of reasons.  Story 
“located Christianity as ‘lying at [the] foundations’ of the common 
law,” and viewed the relationship as essential for protecting the 
sanctity of oaths and contracts.108  Daniel Webster asserted that 
“general, tolerant Christianity, is the law of the land,” by which he
meant it was the common repository of moral guidance for the 
broad mass of the people.109  Only after the Civil War, in 1868, did a 
judicial opinion challenge the maxim that Christianity was a part of 
the common law by pointing out that it “[was] a relic of the time 
when the clergy ruled England . . . . “110
The Minnesota statute at issue in State v. Petit seems to have 
been part of a general post-Civil-War trend in favor of Sunday 
closing laws, justified not so much on strictly religious grounds as 
on the public necessity of providing a generally accepted day of 
rest.111  Liberal Protestant writers sought to frame Sabbatarian 
arguments in inclusive language, justifying enforced Sunday rest “as 
a human institution,”112 beneficial to the growth of culture and the 
refreshment of the people.113  Sunday became a day of
“[e]xcursions, rides, and drives,” and general relaxation.114
The defendant in State v. Petit was arrested for opening his 
barber shop on a Sunday, and challenged the constitutionality of 
the law.115  It was, he said, a violation of the state’s police power and 
“class legislation,” by which he meant a kind of equal protection 
claim: the state had discriminated against barber shops in
specifically directing them to close on Sundays although at the 
same time allowing for “the works of necessity or charity.”116  Who 
was to say whether a shave and a haircut was not a charitable 
107. Id. at 68 (quoting THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 517 
(William W. Story ed. 1852)).
108. Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST.
REV. 27, 49-50 (1998).
109. Id. at 51.
110. Id. at 47 (quoting Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 1, 209 (1868) (Doe, J.,
dissenting)).
111. See ALEXIS MCCROSSEN, HOLY DAY, HOLIDAY: THE AMERICAN SUNDAY 51-78
(2000).
112. Id. at 55.
113. See id. at 55-58.
114. Id. at 79.
115. 74 Minn. 376, 378-79, 77 N.W. 225, 226 (1898).
116. Id.
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enterprise?
Justice Mitchell acknowledged that other jurisdictions had 
rested their affirmations of Sunday closing laws on the relationship 
of Christianity and the common law: “In some states it has been 
held that Christianity is part of the common law of this country, 
and Sunday legislation is upheld, in whole or in part, upon that 
ground.”117  Mitchell, however, preferred another foundation:
Even if permissible, it is not necessary to resort to any such 
reason to sustain such legislation.  The ground upon 
which such legislation is generally upheld is that it is a 
sanitary measure, and as such a legitimate exercise of the 
police power.  It proceeds upon the theory, entertained by 
most of those who have investigated the subject, that the 
physical, intellectual, and moral welfare of mankind
requires a periodical day of rest from labor, and, as some 
particular day must be fixed, the one most naturally
selected is that which is regarded as sacred by the greatest 
number of citizens, and which by custom is generally 
devoted to religious worship, or rest and recreation, as 
this causes the least interference with business or existing 
customs.118
Mitchell acknowledged a kind of natural impulse, a
fundamental human necessity, to seek regular time off from one’s 
labor.119  Mitchell thus wrote: “It is sometimes said that mankind 
will seek cessation of labor at proper times by the natural
influences of the law of self-preservation.”120
Mitchell rejected the claim of those who asserted that Sunday 
closing laws interfered with the right to work: “Labor is in a great 
117. Id. at 379, 77 N.W. at 226.
118. Id.
119. New York Times writer Judith Shulevitz, having recently returned to her Jewish
roots, has written in praise of the Sabbath:
The Israelite Sabbath institutionalized an astonishing, hitherto 
undreamed-of notion: that every single creature has the right to 
rest, not just the rich and the privileged.  Covered under the 
Fourth Commandment are women, slaves, strangers and,
improbably, animals.  The verse in Deuteronomy that elaborates 
on this aspect of the Sabbath repeats, twice, that slaves were not to 
work, as if to drive home what must have been very hard to 
understand in the ancient world.
Judith Shulevitz, Bring Back the Sabbath, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at 50.  Shulevitz
continues: “Do I think everyone else should observe a Sabbath?  I believe it would be 
good for them, and even better for me, since the more widespread the ritual, the 
more likely I am to observe it.” Id.
120. Petit, 74 Minn. at 379, 77 N.W. at 226.
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degree dependent upon capital, and, unless, the exercise of power 
which capital affords is restrained, those who are obliged to labor 
will not possess the freedom for rest which they would otherwise 
exercise.”121
The Sunday closing laws were thus necessary to protect those 
vulnerable to financial pressures:
The object of the law is not so much to protect those who
can rest at pleasure as to afford rest to those who need it, 
and who, from the conditions of society, could not
otherwise obtain it.  Moreover, if the law was not
obligatory upon all, and those who desired to do so were 
permitted to engage in their usual avocation on Sunday, 
others engaged in the same kind of labor or business 
might, against their wishes, be compelled, by the laws of 
competition in business, to do likewise.122
The truth was, Mitchell acknowledged, “that all men are not in 
fact independent and at liberty to work when they choose.”123
It was an easy step, from this premise, for Mitchell to conclude 
that the legislature acted within the scope of its police powers in 
determining whether the operation of a barbershop was or was not 
a work of charity or necessity requiring Sunday business hours.124
He reached this conclusion by sidestepping the contention,
unremarkable in Joseph Story’s day but controversial in his own, 
that Christianity formed a part of the common law.125
E. The Common Law and the Proper Disposal of the Dead
Larson v. Chase involved a lawsuit occasioned by the
defendant’s unauthorized dissection of the body of the plaintiff’s 
deceased husband.126  The law of burial in nineteenth-century
America was in the process of coming to terms with a rather mixed 
set of antecedents.  In England, historically, jurisdiction over burial 
was divided between the courts of common law and the
ecclesiastical courts.  In a statement destined to be repeated many 
times by American courts, Sir Edward Coke wrote:
It is to be observed that, in every sepulcher that hath a 
121. Id. at 380, 77 N.W. at 226.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 379, 77 N.W. at 226.
124. Id. at 381, 77 N.W. at 227.
125. See id.
126. 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
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monument, two things are to be considered, viz., the 
monument, and the sepulture or buriall of the dead.  The 
buriall of the cadaver (that is caro data vermibus) [flesh 
given to worms] is nullius in bonis [a nullity in property], 
and belongs to ecclesiasticall cognisance, but as to the 
monument, action is given . . . at the common law for the 
defacing thereof.127
Such a division of competences was workable in nineteenth-
century England, which still maintained a series of ecclesiastical 
courts that exercised real coercive powers.  It was unworkable, 
however, in a United States where ecclesiastical courts could not 
exercise the same authority.
Among the most important nineteenth-century decisions on 
the subject of burial was the opinion rendered in 1856 by Samuel 
Ruggles, a special master appointed by the New York Court of 
Chancery to determine the compensation owed to a church and its 
congregation for the removal of its cemetery so as to make room 
for a street widening.128  Viewing his role as special master as an 
opportunity to remake American burial law, Ruggles placed a series 
of limitations on Coke’s teaching.  Coke, Ruggles observed, was 
motivated by a desire to expand and secure common-law
jurisdiction vis à vis the ecclesiastical courts.129  His etymology of the 
word “cadaver” as “flesh given to worms” was incorrect.  The Latin 
did not support such a derivation.130  The law, furthermore, did not 
consign the corpse to the worms but entrusted its care to the 
Church.131  These factors limited Coke’s teaching to its English 
context.  The American situation was very different.
Ruggles insisted that even though the English common law, 
because of its shared jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts, did 
not extend legal protection to human remains, the American 
courts, given their different circumstances, should extend such 
protection:
The establishment of a right so sacred and precious,
127. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
203 (1817) (London: E. & R. Brooke 1797).
128. See In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856).
On the importance of this case, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., “The Body of the Human 
Person in American Law: Sacred Receptacle of the Holy Spirit or Marketable
Commodity?” 25-37 (unpublished paper, on file with author).
129. See Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. at 520.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 520-21.
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ought not to need any judicial precedent.  Our courts of 
justice should place it at once, where it should
fundamentally rest for ever, on the deepest and most 
unerring instincts of human nature; and hold it to be a 
self-evident right of humanity, entitled to legal protection, 
consideration of feeling, decency, and Christian duty.132
That Justice Mitchell had this opinion in mind when crafting 
the Larson opinion is clear from his citation to it.133  The plaintiff in 
Larson, the decedent’s widow, alleged that her late husband’s body 
had been “mutilated” and “dissect[ed]” without her permission,
and sought damages on the basis of “mental suffering and nervous 
shock.”134  Mitchell ruled in her favor, and in the process produced 
a sophisticated, historically grounded analysis of the rights of family 
members to the earthly remains of loved ones.
Following Ruggles’ reasoning, Mitchell commenced:
Upon the questions who has the right to the custody of a 
dead body for the purpose of burial, and what remedies 
such person has to protect that right, the English
common-law authorities are not very helpful or
particularly on point, for the reason that from a very early 
date in that country the ecclesiastical courts assumed 
exclusive jurisdiction of such matters.135
American lawyers and judges, however, because of the absence 
of ecclesiastical courts, were required to create a new rule.136  The 
creative process was initially a confusing one: “Inclined to follow 
the precedents of the English common law, these courts were at 
first slow to realize the changed condition of things, and the 
consequent necessity that they should take cognizance of these 
matters and administer remedies as in other analogous cases.”137
Mitchell subtly expressed gratitude to unnamed predecessors as he 
132. Id. at 529.
133. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
Time will not permit, and the occasion does not require, us to 
enter into any extended discussion of the history of the law, civil, 
common, or ecclesiastical, of burial and the disposition of the 
body after death.  A quite full and interesting discussion of the 
subject will be found in the report of the referee . . . .
Id. at 308, 50 N.W. at 238 (citing Hon. S.B. Ruggles, Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. 503).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 308-09, 50 N.W. at 238.  “The repudiation of the ecclesiastical law and 
of ecclesiastical courts by the American colonies left the temporal courts the sole 
protector of the dead, and of the living in their dead.” Id.
137. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 238.
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stated what he described as “[t]he general, if not universal
doctrine” that first spouses, then next of kin, should exercise 
responsibility for the proper burial of the dead.138
That Mitchell cited no authority for this statement of the 
“general” rule is testimony to his own creative skills.  The degree to 
which he innovated can be gauged by his invocation of “common 
custom,” “sentiment,” and “reason.”  “[The rights of spouse or 
next-of-kin over the body] is in accordance, not only with common 
custom and general sentiment, but also, as we think, with
reason.”139  Mitchell continued, “this right, is in the nature of a 
sacred trust, in the performance of which all are interested who 
were allied to the deceased by the ties of family or
friendship . . . .”140
Mitchell then cited and quoted from Sir Edward Coke’s
dictum that there could be no property interest in a corpse.141  He 
reiterated his criticism of Coke’s teaching, noting that it was
“severed from its context.”142  Further qualifying Coke’s dictum, 
Mitchell added:
[I]t will be observed that it is not asserted that no
individual can have any legal interest in a corpse, but 
merely that the burial is nullius in bonis, which was legally 
true at common law at that time, as the whole matter of 
sepulture and custody of the body after burial was within 
the exclusive cognizance of the ecclesiastical courts.143
Mitchell did not want to pursue to its logical conclusion the 
proposition that one might have a property interest in a corpse.
Such reasoning might introduce an impermissible degree of
commercialism into an aspect of human life Mitchell clearly
considered sacred.144  Nevertheless, Mitchell asserted, it was the rule 
“that those who are entitled to the possession and custody of [the 
body] for purposes of decent burial have certain legal rights in it, 
which the law recognizes and will protect.”145  Indeed, even in the 
138. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 238-39.
139. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 239.
140. Id.
141. Id. Cf. COKE, supra note 127 and accompanying text (providing the 
quotation).
142. Larson, 47 Minn. at 310, 50 N.W. at 239.
143. Id.
144. Id.  “[I]t may be true still that a dead body is not property in the common 
commercial sense of that term . . . .” Id.
145. Id.
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absence of a specific property right, the plaintiff’s “interest” was 
sufficiently strong to support a claim for damages.146
Mitchell then turned his attention to the nature of the
damages the plaintiff was entitled to seek.  He conceded that while 
it was “elementary that while the law as a general rule only gives 
compensation for actual injury . . . ,”147 it is always the case that at 
least nominal damages will be awarded for the violation of rights.148
“Every injury imports a damage,” Mitchell declared.149
Mitchell then considered whether mental suffering, “as a 
distinct element of damage,” might ever be the subject of
damages.150  Where a legal right has been infringed, Mitchell 
expressed a willingness to allow damages for mental distress in the 
appropriate circumstances:
‘[F]or the law to furnish redress there must be an act 
which, under the circumstances, is wrongful; and it must 
take effect upon the person, the property, or some other 
legal interest, of the party complaining.  Neither one 
without the other is sufficient.’  This is but another way of 
saying that no action for damages will lie for an act which, 
though wrongful, infringed no legal right of the plaintiff,
although it may have caused him mental suffering.  But, 
where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement of a 
legal right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is 
the direct, proximate, and natural result of the wrongful 
act.151
Mitchell then brought the rule he had just enunciated home 
to the case at bar: “That mental suffering and injury to the feelings 
would be ordinarily the natural and proximate result of knowledge 
that the remains of a deceased husband had been mutilated is too 
plain to admit of argument.”152  The offense to be compensated, 
Mitchell concluded, was “the indignity to the dead.”153
146. Id.  “[W]e think it may be safely laid down as a general rule that an injury to 
any right recognized and protected by the common law will, if the direct and 
proximate consequence of an actionable wrong, be a subject for compensation.”  Id.
147. Id. at 310, 50 N.W. at 239.
148. Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239-40.
152. Id. at 312, 50 N.W. at 240.
153. Id.  The result in this case can be distinguished from Francis v. Western Union 
Telegraph in that Mitchell concluded in the latter case that the plaintiff lacked a legally 
cognizable right to be compensated for the mental anguish caused by the nondelivery 
of a telegram.  58 Minn. 252, 59 N.W. 1078 (1894).  As Mitchell acerbically put it, he 
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IV. CONCLUSION
To appreciate William Mitchell’s creativity, one must recapture 
the essence of what it meant to be a common-law judge in late 
nineteenth-century America.  It was an era that placed great faith in 
the possibility that judges, relying upon tradition and precedent, 
might fashion novel solutions for the time.  As Benjamin Cardozo, 
the final and greatest of the common-law judges, described the 
process in 1921, it was experimental, embracing the community of 
judges and lawyers and extending over the generations.154  Where 
“there is no decisive precedent,” where the various parties in the 
case before the bench can all present plausible claims, it belongs to 
the judge to select among competing principles those best tailored 
to reach a just result.155
“The common law,” Cardozo stressed, “does not work from 
pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to
conclusions derived from them deductively.  Its method is
inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars.”156
Quoting from Munroe Smith, Cardozo continued:
The rules and principles of case law have never been 
treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses,
continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, 
the courts of justice.  Every new case is an experiment; 
and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a 
result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.157
This description fairly matches the sort of method one
discerns at work in Mitchell’s judicial opinions.  His concern
preeminently was with the doing of justice in particular cases, even 
while remaining solidly grounded within the common-law
tradition.
It would be anachronistic, painfully anachronistic, to try to fit 
Mitchell’s jurisprudence within conventional contemporary
did not wish to carve out an exception from a general rule for what he pejoratively
termed “telegraph cases.” Id. at 262, 59 N.W. at 1080.  He preferred to follow the 
general rule “that damages for mental suffering resulting from a breach of contract is 
wholly unknown to and unauthorized by the common law . . . .” Id.  Tortious
“indignity to the dead” simply fell into a different category of law governed by 
different rules of damages. Larson, 47 Minn. at 312, 50 N.W. at 240.
154. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21-23 (Colonial 
Press 1960) (1921).
155. Id. at 21.
156. Id. at 22-23.
157. Id. at 23 (quoting MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909)).
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stereotypes of left or right.  Clearly, in the course of his long 
judicial career, he produced opinions that might be described 
variously as progressive or as conservative.  He apprehended the 
coercive powers of large pools of capital on vulnerable workers.158
He thus upheld Sunday closing laws as a surrogate for other forms 
of restricting the numbers of hours worked by employees.159  But he 
endorsed with equal enthusiasm an innovative reading of the 
common-law tradition on restraints of trade that allowed for the 
emergence of monopolies.160
Was there a principled coherence to Mitchell’s decision-
making?  Or was he a results-oriented jurisprude, deciding cases on 
the bases of hunches that changed over the years, or even from 
case to case?
The coherence, it seems, lies in Mitchell’s own fidelity to the 
process of common-law, historical reasoning as described by
Cardozo.  Mitchell’s invocation of the common law frequently 
presaged the fashioning of new rules, intended to improve upon 
the received learning, even while remaining faithful to first
principles.  Where he departed from the tradition, as he did with 
burial law, he did so because the context of the English common-
law rule simply did not fit American circumstances.  And it is this 
sort of case, sensitive both to the rule and to the context in which it 
was formulated, that characterized the kind of command he had 
over his legal sources.  Indeed, it can be said that it is precisely in 
the mastery of his sources, in his appreciation of the text and 
context of his precedents, that Mitchell’s greatness can be
discerned.
158. See State v. Petit, 74 Minn. 376, 77 N.W. 225 (1898).
159. See id.
160. See Nat’l Ben. Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45 Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891).
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